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Why You Should Be A Law-Abiding
Anarchist (Except When
You Shouldn’t)

HEIDI M. HURD*

I don’t like rules. I find they chafe. And I fear for the soul of anyone
who allows them to preempt right action. And if I could pick one lesson
in life that I would want my children to internalize, it would be to be
very suspect of rules, and of those who seek to wield them as reasons not
to do what, all things considered, it seems best to do. This is because
people who invest social rules with hefty normative power work at lousy
jobs, stay in lousy marriages, and permit themselves only the most
conventional pursuits. They beat back a percolating sense of despair by
forcefully asserting that they are not quitters and compensate for their
deep-seated resentment of freer-spirits by becoming the champions of
procedural due process so as to mask their jealousy with selfrighteousness. And people who invest legal rules with an authority that
out-distances the wisdom of those rules become complicit in the
injustices perpetrated in the name of law. While many of those injustices
may be small, we have seen in our own lifetimes how an exaggerated
belief in the authority of law can prompt a docile citizenry to permit
gross poverty, oppression, and even appallingly wide-spread genocide.
So I will not advance an argument for why it is rational on your part to
follow rules when they demand that you do things that are contrary to
what reason would otherwise dictate. On the contrary, I will beg you to
* Dean and David C. Baum Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of
Illinois College of Law.
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be suspicious of those who advertise that the hair shirts that they have
woven for you will be both comfortable and flattering.
Now, does this mean that I do not think there are good reasons
generally to abide by the social and legal rules of our society? Certainly
not. There are many good reasons to abide by rules, and I have devoted
an entire book to their analysis.1 But in the end, the rationality of
following any given rule resides in one’s confidence that one is acting on
the balance of reasons for action—including the good reasons for
following the rule—and not at all in the fact that there is a rule; and this
means that if there are weightier reasons to break the rule than to abide
by it, all reasons for rule-following considered, the fact that what one is
breaking is a rule is no more significant than would be the breaking of a
stick.
Fortunately for our society (though perhaps not for other societies),
the reasons to abide by social and legal rules are numerous and weighty,
and hence, we have good grounds to believe that the order that we enjoy
will not give way to chaos if children like mine are tutored to reject any
claim that they ought to follow rules for rules’ sake. Let me list some of
the most obvious of these reasons so as to make clear that the anarchist’s
fundamental refusal to substitute rules for her own judgment is fully
compatible with, and indeed largely dictates, a life that rarely runs amok
of the law.
A. Why Should Anarchists Follow the Law (Consistent
With Their Anarchism)?
1. Fear of Personal Moral Error
Given the complexity of morality’s demands, we should be very often
in doubt about the moral merits of our actions. I believe that morality’s
demands are highly complex, requiring extensive consequential calculations,
the application of sophisticated deontological rights-based side-constraints
(with threshold overrides), and an attention to the virtues and vices that
aretaic theory often pits against deontic theory.2 In the face of moral
doubt, we have every reason to seek guidance about what we ought to
do, and social and legal rules—within our society, at least—are relevant
sources of moral advice. Just as we commonly use customs and laws to
assist us in defining what is reasonable (for example, in tort law), so we

1. HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT (1999).
2. For discussions of these components of a comprehensive moral theory, see
Heidi M. Hurd, Liberty in Law, 21 LAW & PHIL. 385 (2002); Heidi M. Hurd, Duties
Beyond the Call of Duty, 6 ANN. REV. L. & ETHICS 3 (1999); Heidi M. Hurd, The
Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249 (1996).
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should reach to social and legal rules when they give us insight into what
is moral. After all, social rules, like industry customs, have been
generated and tested by the repeated experiences of a multitude of
generations, and so we have some reason to believe that they capture
behaviors that are in everyone’s best interests over the long run. And
legal rules are products of decisionmaking procedures that have evolved
over time so as to protect and advance values of common allegiance by
often very differently situated persons. That courts and legislatures have
extensive fact-finding capacities, invite substantial debate and
discussion, pit disputants against one another in adversarial combat so as
to test arguments against their opposites, and so forth, gives us some
reason to think that the outcomes of lawmaking processes are reliable
indicators of what we should do to honor our own obligations.
2. Fear of Others’ Moral Errors
Even when we are confident that in breaking a rule we would in fact
be serving right reason, we have good reasons to abide by the rule if in
breaking it, we would be setting an example for others who are less
capable than ourselves at discerning when rules are in error. The
justified fear of inducing unjustified copycatting is commonplace in
parents, as for example, when we refrain from our usual jaywalking
when accompanied by our children, because we fear their inability to
decipher when it is safe to forsake the crosswalk for the open curb. But
the need to safeguard others from their own temptation to copy one’s
rule-breaking in unfortunate circumstances is not confined to children.
If otherwise justified rule-breaking will induce unjustified rule-breaking
by others, then we have good reasons to set an example of rulefollowing for those who ought to defer to rules more often than they
otherwise would if our conduct inspired them to second-guess the
wisdom of such rules in their own circumstances.
3. Moral Demands of Democracy
Even when we have grounds to doubt that democratically-created
social and legal rules in fact capture what would be in everyone’s best
interests, the values that lie behind democracy—that is, the values that
support governmental structures which allow the majority to give itself
its own rules—themselves often dictate compliance with less-thanoptimal democratically-enacted rules. Consider two arguments for
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according democratic results substantial moral weight. The first is that
when a moral matter is in dispute (even a matter that concerns
competing claims of right, rather than competing claims of preference or
utility) and it is more important (again, perhaps as a matter of right) to
gain a peaceful resolution of the dispute than to gain a right resolution at
a cost to peace, a democratic resolution will recommend itself, and the
value of peace will thus dictate compliance with the democraticallycrafted solution, even when one takes the resolution to be in error.
Second, when rights are not at stake, it is reasonable to assume that
what ought to be done is what the majority (subjectively) prefers or takes
to be in its best interests. There are at least two reasons for this. First,
one might reasonably suppose that the majority’s subjective views
concerning its best interests are the best evidence available of what
would, in fact, be in the majority’s best interests. If what ought to be
done is what is in the best interests of all, one can do no better in
assessing those interests than to tabulate (as democracy does) the
subjective views of the majority. When democratically-enacted rules reflect
the majority’s judgments or preferences in circumstances in which
morality dictates that such judgments govern, one has a sound epistemic
reason to abide by them even when one perceives them as being at odds
with what would in fact be in the majority’s best interests or optimal on
other grounds.
Second, in many instances in which others’ rights are not at stake, the
sole reasons for action applicable to agents are often those that derive
from their own personal projects. These “agent-relative reasons” give
agents reasons for action, but they do not give others reasons for action
or otherwise enter into others’ practical reasoning. Thus, for example, it
is of agent-relative moral significance that an action will thwart my
personal career goals, or do damage (but not injustice) to one of my
valued relationships; or require me to sacrifice a private hobby. While
persons can go wrong by making choices concerning agent-relative
reasons for action that fail to accord with the balance of those reasons, ex
hypothesi such moral failures do not implicate others’ moral interests,
and hence, they are ineligible for others’ moral condemnation. When
democracy tabulates people’s assessments of their own agent-relative
reasons for action, it might yield results at odds with the balance of those
reasons (because people might have failed to conform their votes to their
private reasons for action), but its results are immune from criticism by
those who perceive the mismatch between legislation and the agentrelative reasons for action that imperfectly motivated its enactment.
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4. The Value of Coordination
Just because persons are used to looking to social and legal rules to
resolve questions of prima facie moral conflict, such rules can very often
provide salient solutions to coordination problems. And when they do—that
is, when one has sound reason to think that others’ expectations concerning
one’s conduct will “nest” in the pronouncements of lawmakers—one has
a reason to abide by those pronouncements just because one has a reason
to coordinate with others so as to extract the benefits of collective action.
And once coordination has been achieved by converging on a single
course of action articulated by lawmakers to the exclusion of other,
equally legitimate courses of conduct, the value of coordination is
sufficient to compel continued action in accordance with the law (other
things being equal). Admittedly, of course, in such instances one is
conforming one’s conduct to law without, in fact, “obeying” the law. But
inasmuch as the gains from social cooperation are vast, and inasmuch as
the law constitutes the single most salient source of coordination
available, we can expect that individuals’ behavior will track the law in
ways that ought to allow us to sleep well at night.
5. The Value of Reliance
Relatedly, when others rely to their possible detriment on a belief that
one will comport one’s actions to social and legal rules, one has a reason
to do so that derives from the value of protecting reliance interests.
Other things being equal, we are not entitled to act in ways that harm
others; and when others rely on our acting in accordance with rules and
alter their positions accordingly, we can render them worse off by
violating the rules that provide the basis of their reliance. So in the
interest of not harming others, we have reasons to follow rules that
others expect us to follow.
Reliance arguments are, of course, only as strong as the reliance that
they reference. Thus, if people ceased to rely upon others’ rulefollowing—because, for example, they came to take seriously my thesis
that the law does not determine right action—then this reason for
following rules would be lost. Because I am reasonably sure that the
irrational tendency to invest rules with undue authority is likely to survive
academic criticism, I am reasonably sure that the (often irrational)
reliance by others on our own rule-following will persist as a significant
reason to follow (otherwise irrational) rules.
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6. The Value of Equality
Finally, there is at least modest virtue in treating like cases alike—that
is, in ensuring that we all treat similarly-situated people in a manner that
is similar. If I give my son a cookie, that is a reason to give my daughter a
cookie, even if I believe that I was wrong to give my son a cookie. And
if my colleagues impose a grading curve in grading their students, the
value of equality gives me a reason to impose one on my own students,
even if I believe that they will then receive grades that poorly capture the
Platonicallly-conceived grades that I would otherwise give them.
The value of equality gives us reasons both to coordinate with our past
and future selves and to coordinate with others so as to ensure that we
treat people as we’ve treated those in the past and as we will treat those
in the future; and so as to treat people as others have treated similarlysituated persons in the past and as they will treat them in the future. The
demand for equal treatment thus generates complex coordination
problems. I need to know what you have done and are likely to do in the
future so that I may treat people in a manner that is equal to how you
have treated and will treat similarly-situated people. You stand in need
of the same information from me. And we all stand in such situations
vis-à-vis our own past and future selves.
Once again, we can solve these coordination problems by reaching to
social and legal rules. So long as compliance with such rules does not
work other injustices (or so long as the injustices inflicted by following
such rules are less significant in kind and degree than the injustices
accrued by treating persons unequally), such rule-following may
guarantee that we act consistently over time and identically to others.
And if by following such rules we can better ensure that similarlysituated persons are treated similarly, then we all have a reason to follow
such rules absent any more salient, equality-producing equilibria.
B. Why Should Everyone Share the Anarchists’ Distrust of the Law?
Now that’s a short list of the reasons why I believe that it is generally
appropriate, indeed, generally obligatory, to comport one’s conduct in
accordance with social and legal rules, and why I will teach my children
to do the same. Some are individually very powerful reasons to comport
our conduct to the dictates of others; collectively, I would submit, the
fear of error and the values that lie behind the rule of law and the
protection of democracy conspire to demand a pretty law-abiding life.
But let’s be clear. None of these considerations, nor any set together,
justifies blind obedience to law or unthinking social conformity. None
of these considerations gives us a reason to follow the law because it’s
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the law or to abide by social rules because they are rules. So those who
seek reasons for rule-following will argue that I have given you no
reason to follow rules that takes as special the fact that rules are rules.
All I have told you is that you should avoid moral error, avoid inducing
it in others, seek coordination when it will bring significant rewards,
honor reliance interests, protect democracy, and preserve equality; and
when, as a practical matter, rules assist you in doing what you should
otherwise do, you should follow rules.
But I have not told you that you should follow rules even when they
fail to serve epistemic and moral goals. I have not told you why you
should follow rules even when they offend against the balance of
reasons for action. So I have not vindicated the blind obedience with
which many self-righteously follow rules. Indeed, many would argue
that I have not made a case for any sort of “obedience” at all!
But why would one want to do that? Why would one ever want
people to follow rules when their better judgment, brought to bear on all
the reasons for action available to them (including the many hefty
reasons for following rules that I have given you) suggests that they
ought to break them? Well, of course, the timeless answer is that if
people feel licensed to re-examine the wisdom of rules every time they
apply them, rules will lose their advantages. Cognitive limitations will
prevent people from accurately assessing and weighing the reasons for
and against abiding by rules, so that persons will mistakenly suspend
rules more often than they should. And volitional impediments—weakness
of the will, as it were—will motivate them to discount the wisdom of
acting according to rules when doing so will permit short term
personal gratification. So if right action is the goal, the claim is that
persons will do better if they never second-guess the wisdom of rules if,
over the long run, following such rules will result in acting rightly more
often than if they subject such rules to case-by-case scrutiny. And as
critics will argue, my reasons for why citizens in a just democracy
should give rules more weight than they might otherwise first accord
them do nothing to answer this puzzle. If considerations of error,
coordination, reliance, equality, and democracy are taken seriously,
people might break rules less often; but they are still likely to go against
them more often than they should.
Something has to give, and we philosophers have to figure out which
it will be: Either we have to make blind obedience—i.e., the suspension
of practical reason—reasonable; or we have to abandon the view that
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right action consists of action in accordance with the balance of reasons
for action, so as to make it right that people periodically knowingly do
wrong by deliberately following rules that would plainly be far better
broken. Because I have failed to seize hold of, and wrestle with, one of
these horns of the dilemma, it will be argued that I have failed to get the
point of this symposium.
Well, I don’t see any hope for victory in an encounter with the first
horn of the dilemma. I’ve devoted the better part of a book and two
articles to a critique of Joseph Raz’s claim that laws can generate
second-order reasons for obedience that make it rational not to act on the
balance of first-order reasons for action.3 And quite frankly, I’m
completely sick of reciting that critique. So let me instead say a few
words about Scott Shapiro’s interesting alternative: the suggestion that
once one has concluded that one will do better in the long run by abiding
by the rules generated by a given source (be it a court, a legislature,
society’s collective conventions, or a single authority), one can plausibly
employ mental ropes to tie oneself to the mast of obedience just as
Ulysses used physical ones to tie himself to the mast of his ship.4 Put
differently, just as Ulysses adopted physical restraints that caused him
not to be responsive to the Sirens’ song; so we can adopt mental
restraints that will cause us not to be responsive to reasons for action
that would contradict the demands of long-term beneficial rules.
And how do these mental ropes work so as to causally preclude
independent thought after one has submitted to an authority? According
to Shapiro, submission to authority can feasibly suppress free-thinking
by two means: cognitive repression and volitional inhibition:
First . . . [t]he reasons for disobeying would . . . be ‘repressed’ by the directive. This
repression blocks the possibility of intentional action contrary to the directive—the
agent, being unaware of reasons for not complying, would be unable to disobey
for a reason. Secondly . . . [a]n agent in the grip of an authority might no longer
be able to withstand certain emotional pressures, such as guilt and shame, even
though the agent would be aware of the important reasons for not complying.5

Now if I, or anyone I know, were capable of using her will to
accomplish what Ulysses accomplished with ropes—to causally induce
cognitive blindness and emotional inhibition—I would be at pains to
suggest that this would be normatively far less desirable than permitting
the sort of independent judgment that risks rule violations in unjustified
3. HURD, MORAL COMBAT, supra note 1; Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging Authority,
100 YALE L.J. 1611 (1991); Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 2203 (1992).
4. Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 382, 415–19, 427–30 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
5. Id. at 428.
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circumstances. I’d rather my children make and live with their own
mistakes than that they figure out how to harness the tools of guilt,
shame, and repression so as to tie themselves into psychological knots
that will allow them to live with the mistakes induced by the directives
of another.
Fortunately, I am quite sure that a mental rope stands to a hemp rope
the way that punk rock stands to music and hypothetical consent stands
to real consent: namely, it’s not. After all, if the will could disable
temptation and bar calculation, Ulysses would hardly have needed his
hemp ropes! He needed them precisely because his present self couldn’t
bind his future self except by physical means. And so it is, I believe,
with us. We can alter or rearrange our environment so as to remove
reasons for action that would otherwise force themselves upon us; and
we can avoid situations in which volitional weaknesses are most prone
to assert themselves. But we cannot, through will alone, cause ourselves
not to know what we know, not to believe what we believe, and not to be
responsive to powerful feelings, desires, and temptations.
So, we can decide not to have children if we think that we’ll be lousy
at according their interests greater weight than our own; we can avoid
bars that sell fine cigars if we fear that once in them we’ll succumb to
the temptations of good scotch and expensive imports. And similarly, if
we fear our own inability to assess and comply with certain rules, we can
often structure our activities so as to escape the chafing quality of those
rules. (I always let someone else drive when I can, because that removes
my ability to second-guess the wisdom of red lights and speed limits!)
And like Ulysses, we ought to co-opt the causal power of circumstances
to self-paternalistic ends whenever we can do so to protect right action
from error or temptation.
But to say this is not to say that it’s ever rational to abandon reason; it
is only to say that it is rational to manipulate one’s circumstances so as
to give reason its best chance against cognitive and volitional
impairments. And so this is not to win out over the dilemma of rulefollowing by cutting off its first horn.
So what of the second horn of the dilemma? If I won’t concede that
abandonment of reason can be rational, then presumably I have to say
that it is sometimes right knowingly to do wrong. That is, I presumably
have to concede that it is right to follow a rule when it is, and is known
to be, over-inclusive, so long as that rule, if always followed, will
guarantee more instances of right action than wrong action over time.
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Well, I’m not going to concede this. I think it’s just silly. If the reasons
for a rule—all reasons considered (including the weighty systemic ones I
outlined in the previous part)—are, in fact, better served by violating the
rule, then I should violate the rule, and threats that I’ll do so in error on
another day are quite irrelevant to the question of whether it would be
right to violate it today. When and if I go wrong and violate a rule under
circumstances in which the reasons dictated my conformity, then I
ought, indeed, to be punished. Not only will I get my just deserts, but
such a sanction will help to educate me about the true wisdom of the rule
I violated: it will add to my database, and the databases of others, so that
in future similar circumstances, I and others will have more evidence of
the reasons for action applicable to us.
And this is at least how I want to educate my children. I don’t want to
repress their judgment; I don’t want to chill their free action by inducing
shame or guilt that will inhibit their responses to their own independent
conclusions. I want them to second-guess rules whenever they suspect
that those rules are mistaken, and I want them to set those rules aside
when they are right about that. And when my children are wrong about
the applicability of a rule, I want them to pay a price—not because they
broke a rule, but because they over-weighted their own interests, underweighted others’ interests, and/or otherwise failed to take seriously the
values that dictated conduct that accorded with the social or legal rule.
And if they commit by autonomous choice more mistakes than I would
commit on their behalf, they at least will have the satisfaction of their
mistakes being theirs and not mine. And it strikes me as a minimum
condition of a well-lived life that one own one’s mistakes as fully as one
own one’s successes.
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